Tag Archives: Proposition 77

[From NCP] No on Proposition 77: Reason #3

[Originally posted on Norcal Politics, November 7, 2005]

This is the last installment in my No on 77 series.  It was supposed to have been completed long ago, but the day job and a virus conspired against that timeline. 

Bottom Line #3:   Why are Republicans and their Big Business allies funding the campaign for Proposition 77?  Why are they pushing Proposition 77 now, in a special election when turnout will be low?  The short answer is that there’s something in it for them, and they want to ram it through as soon as they can.  It’s not about principle — that’s a flat out lie.  As described before, it’s all about Republican power.

Continue reading [From NCP] No on Proposition 77: Reason #3

[From NCP] No on Proposition 77: Reason #2

[Originally posted at NorCal Politics, October 25, 2005]

Bottom Line #2:  Even if you support nonpartisan redistricting (and I do), Proposition 77 is not the way to do it.  It is (a) procedurally flawed, (b)  is unrepresentative of the voters of the State of California, and (c) likely to reduce legislative representation of Democrats and minorities.  Proposition 77 changes the California Constitution, and it will be difficult to change it again.  Even if the Republicans were willing to adopt a similar model in Texas (which is unlikely) to balance California’s choices, we have to get the solution to this problem right the first time, and Proposition 77 does not get it right.

Procedural Flaws 

The clearest criticism of this problem comes from the California League of Women Voters:

County elections officials are concerned that a redrawing of the lines immediately after the November election could not be done properly in time for the 2006 elections. If the process is rushed through, public input may be compromised.

[…]

Proposition 77 requires that the redistricting plan adopted by the three-judge panel must be placed on the ballot and voted upon by the people of California. On that same ballot we would elect representatives from those same new districts! And, if the plan is rejected, the entire redistricting process would be repeated, including a vote on the new lines at the next general election.

The concerns of county election officials can be found in this document published by the California Association of Clerks and Election Officials.  Long story short, it would be almost impossible to implement the redistricting in time for the 2006 elections. 

Just for a start, the redistricting commission envisioned by Proposition 77 would have to take place in the two weeks between the official certification of the election results on 12/17/05 and the primary election filing deadline of 12/30/05.  Otherwise, the candidates and the voters would have no idea what districts they are in when they file.  And then what happens if the new districts are rejected in a 2006 election?  Which districts do the winning candidates represent?

Not Representative of Californians

Again, the California League of Women Voters has a succinct description of the problem:

Responsibility for redistricting should be vested in a bipartisan special commission that includes citizens at large, representatives of public interest groups, and minority group interests. This proposition establishes a commission of just three retired judges. In the near term, such a panel almost certainly will not be diverse in background or ethnicity.

And, as we saw yesterday, by way of PowerPAC Blog, retired judges are not remotely representative of Californians as a group:

The 2000 Census found the ethnic breakdown of the state’s 33 million people to be about 47 percent white, 32 percent Latino, 11 percent Asian/Pacific Islander, 7 percent black and 3 percent other. Slightly more than half the state’s residents were women and about 11 percent were ages 65 or older.

Retired judges have a very different look. Statistics maintained by the state Judicial Council show that nearly 90 percent of the retired judges are men. There’s no ethnic breakdown for them, but a study for the Assembly elections committee showed that about 4 percent of the judges had Spanish surnames and 2 percent had Asian surnames.

Superior Court judges now make $143,000 a year, so even a retired judge living on his pension is making far more than the $53,025 that was the average income for a California family in 2000.

As a side note, I find it fascinating that Proposition 77, being pushed by the Republicans (I just got my Republican Party slate mailer today) relies upon a limited number of unelected judges to make decisions affecting all of us.  Apparently the Republicans only hate "unelected judges" when they’re likely to do something the Republicans don’t like.

Effect on Democrats and Minorities

A survey of a number of different sources concerning redistricting methods turns up some startling consistencies.  First, the primary methods used to gerrymander out-of-power groups are simple to understand.  You pack them into a few highly concentrated districts.  Those you can’t or won’t pack, you crack and stack into districts so that they are reliably in the minority.  And finally, you try to ensure that the redistricting pairs incumbents of the other party in new districts, while keeping your incumbents in new, safe districts.  This has gotten much easier in recent years, thanks to increasing processor power and affordable software.

Now, Proposition 77 doesn’t, as a formal matter, allow pairing.  The judges who make up the commission are supposed to not take into account the address of any incumbents.  But, the combination of (a) Proposition 77’s focus on compactness and adherence to city and county boundaries as criteria for redistricting and (b) the absence of any consideration of what are called "communities of interest", will combine to pack Democrats into fewer urban districts and crack and stack minorities into majority-majority districts. 

For example, Arizona has a redistricting commission that uses compactness and contiguity as the criteria for district boundaries.  In 2004, Arizona went for Bush 55% to 44%, but 6 of 8 of its House Members are Republicans.  None of the House races were remotely competitive. The districts in which the Democrats won encompassed, respectively, Phoenix and Tuscon + Nogales.

Or take Iowa, with a redistricting commission that uses the same criteria as Proposition 77:  compactness, contiguity, and political boundaries.  In 2004, Iowa went for Bush 50% to 49%, but 4 of 5 House Members are Republicans.  Only one of those races was within ten percent, and that was the race in which the Democrat won.  Unsurprisingly, this district includes Des Moines.

Proposition 77 is not the solution to the problem of politicized redistricting.  As I’ve written, it amounts to unilateral disarmament by California Democrats in the face of Republican gerrymandering in other states, substituting a "rules-based" anti-Democrat gerrymander.

Vote No on Proposition 77.

[From NCP] No on Proposition 77: Reason #1

[Originally posted at NorCal Politics on October 16, 2005]

I tried to write just one post about all of the reasons that Proposition 77 is such a bad idea. It got far too long, so I’ll be serializing it this week. The first installment is below.

Bottom Line #1: You can’t separate Arnold Schwarzenegger’s “neutral” redistricting plan from the larger Republican strategy of creating a permanent majority by changing the field of play. Schwarzenegger’s plan is part of a pure Republican power play, just as much as the Republican redistricting of Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Florida and Tom Delay’s infamous redistricting of Texas.

Continue reading [From NCP] No on Proposition 77: Reason #1