Back on July 30, Jerry McNerney, on his way home from a weekend visit to Iraq, held a conference call with reporters. Shocked by the ensuing quotes from the Congressman, I publicly questioned his commitment to the ideals he espoused during his campaign in 2006. Now, the quotes were all over the map, depending on which newspaper you read, but the one that started to show up the most reliably in the following days was from the AP story entitled “Democrats Praise Military Progress:
California Democratic Rep. Jerry McNerney had a different take. After visiting Iraq last month and visiting with Petraeus, McNerney said signs of progress led him to decide he’ll be a little more flexible about when troops should be brought home.
“I’m more willing to work with finding a way forward to accommodate what the generals are saying,” McNerney said.
In that single quote, McNerney seemed to be simultaneously backing off of both a timeline with a concrete ending date AND spouting Republican talking points.
That’s why I was relieved to receive an email from the McNerney campaign today setting the record straight. Here is McNerney’s statement:
I am firmly in favor of withdrawing troops on a timeline that includes both a definite start date and a definite end date (“date certain”) and uses clearly-defined benchmarks. I am not in favor of an “open-ended” timeline for withdrawal, as some members of Congress have proposed recently.
As many foreign policy experts agree, setting a date certain for withdrawal is fundamental to forcing George W. Bush to bring our troops home from Iraq and ensuring the Iraqis step up and defend their own country. That’s why — even as I consider all proposals as a matter of due diligence — I am standing strong on setting a definite redeployment end date (as an example, I recently voted for the “Responsible Redeployment from Iraq Act” to safely draw down our troops over the course of nine months).
More on the flip…
Additionally, McNerney urged his supporters to read last weekend’s op-ed in the New York Times, The War As We Saw It, written by seven returning troop members. Based on their shared on-the-ground experiences, these soldiers were able to offer penetrating insights:
Viewed from Iraq at the tail end of a 15-month deployment, the political debate in Washington is indeed surreal. Counterinsurgency is, by definition, a competition between insurgents and counterinsurgents for the control and support of a population. To believe that Americans, with an occupying force that long ago outlived its reluctant welcome, can win over a recalcitrant local population and win this counterinsurgency is far-fetched. As responsible infantrymen and noncommissioned officers with the 82nd Airborne Division soon heading back home, we are skeptical of recent press coverage portraying the conflict as increasingly manageable and feel it has neglected the mounting civil, political and social unrest we see every day. (Obviously, these are our personal views and should not be seen as official within our chain of command.)
The claim that we are increasingly in control of the battlefields in Iraq is an assessment arrived at through a flawed, American-centered framework. Yes, we are militarily superior, but our successes are offset by failures elsewhere. What soldiers call the “battle space” remains the same, with changes only at the margins. It is crowded with actors who do not fit neatly into boxes: Sunni extremists, Al Qaeda terrorists, Shiite militiamen, criminals and armed tribes. This situation is made more complex by the questionable loyalties and Janus-faced role of the Iraqi police and Iraqi Army, which have been trained and armed at United States taxpayers’ expense. […]
Given the situation, it is important not to assess security from an American-centered perspective. The ability of, say, American observers to safely walk down the streets of formerly violent towns is not a resounding indicator of security. What matters is the experience of the local citizenry and the future of our counterinsurgency. When we take this view, we see that a vast majority of Iraqis feel increasingly insecure and view us as an occupation force that has failed to produce normalcy after four years and is increasingly unlikely to do so as we continue to arm each warring side.
Coupling our military strategy to an insistence that the Iraqis meet political benchmarks for reconciliation is also unhelpful. The morass in the government has fueled impatience and confusion while providing no semblance of security to average Iraqis. Leaders are far from arriving at a lasting political settlement. This should not be surprising, since a lasting political solution will not be possible while the military situation remains in constant flux. […]
Political reconciliation in Iraq will occur, but not at our insistence or in ways that meet our benchmarks. It will happen on Iraqi terms when the reality on the battlefield is congruent with that in the political sphere. There will be no magnanimous solutions that please every party the way we expect, and there will be winners and losers. The choice we have left is to decide which side we will take. Trying to please every party in the conflict — as we do now — will only ensure we are hated by all in the long run. […]
In the end, we need to recognize that our presence may have released Iraqis from the grip of a tyrant, but that it has also robbed them of their self-respect. They will soon realize that the best way to regain dignity is to call us what we are — an army of occupation — and force our withdrawal.
After wondering just what to make of McNerney’s confusing and seemingly contradictory positions over the last three weeks, it’s a relief to finally have a clear and concise statement of where Jerry McNerney stands on the Iraq occupation. I imagine that all his supporters are grateful for the clarification. If you’d like to comment directly to McNerney, you can post a comment at his blog.
Cross posted at The Progressive Connection