Tag Archives: P3

HSR and P3: A Shotgun Wedding?

This is crossposted from my new California High Speed Rail blog

As those of you who have been reading me for the last year know, I love high speed rail. And you’d also know that I am deeply skeptical – to put it mildly – of public private partnerships (P3). So what am I to do when they are joined together in a shotgun wedding? From a press release put out by the California High Speed Rail Authority:

California High-Speed Rail Authority Executive Director Mehdi Morshed, joined Governor Schwarzenegger Tuesday in participating in a roundtable discussion at the State Capitol regarding the importance of investing in California’s infrastructure and maintaining the state’s economic growth through public private partnerships.

Mr. Morshed noted the California proposed system of high-speed trains offers a unique opportunity to develop a new model for “P3” or public private partnership financing….

Mr. Morshed noted that high-speed trains are attractive to private investors because California’s proposed system will bring a $1 billion annual profit or surplus, once built.

Now it’s not as if this is totally new. The 2002 Implementation Plan always envisioned that private financing would play some sort of role in the HSR project, although at the time it was expected to be limited to the bonds.

But what exactly is meant by “private financing” – and how bad might this really be for HSR?

The Authority’s finance team anticipates public-private partnership opportunities will include project debt financing, vendor financing, system operations and private ownership.

I can live with private involvement in debt and vendor financing, even though government can always borrow more cheaply. System operations is iffy at best – government runs the French, Spanish, German, and Japanese lines quite well, and when system operations were privatized in Britain, the results were deadly. Private ownership, however, is a line we must not cross – public ownership of infrastructure is key to an effective, safe, and affordable transportation system for Californians. High speed rail is an economic catalyst and an environmental and sustainablity necessity. It needs to be held in public hands for public uses, and not hollowed out for private profit.

And that $1 billion is a very, very enticing figure, especially for private companies and investors, who likely see in public infrastructure the kind of profit opportunities that they are now being denied in real estate and financial speculation. But that $1 billion would also be incredibly useful in building out the full HSR network envisioned in the 2002 Implementation Plan – or extending the service beyond its current routing (building an Altamont Pass alignment, for example).

In Europe, those operating surpluses are regularly plowed back into expansion of the HSR network. Spain’s first HSR line, the AVE train from Madrid to Córdoba and Sevilla, proved so profitable that RENFE (Spain’s government-owned rail network) was able to plow that money into recent extensions to Malaga, Valladolid, and Barcelona. France’s state-owned rail network, SNCF has been able to do the same with expansion of its TGV lines as well. The operating surplus alone does not pay for these projects, but it helps reduce the added bond or tax monies needed to construct the new lines. Or, the surplus could be used to pay the bonds off ahead of schedule.

So there is a strong incentive to use those operating surpluses for HSR upgrades and extensions or bond repayment, instead of handing it over to private investors. But it seems clear that P3 is the price of obtaining Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s support for the plan. From the press release:

The bond measure, which is within the Schwarzenegger Administration’s current debt capacity guidelines, will also provide nearly $1 billion for improvements to local and regional passenger trains projects that complement and connect with the high-speed train system. The bond is also a significant component of the Governor’s Strategic Growth Plan as described in his proposed 2008-09 budget.

That section, especially the language about “debt capacity guidelines,” seems a very clear signal to me that Arnold is going to throw his weight behind the November HSR bond – but only because it promotes his goal of P3 for public works.

It’s a shotgun wedding, and the question is, how should we react? Is HSR worth the price of P3? Already we’re having to accept a lot of tough things to get this project moving. The Pacheco Pass alignment seems less ideal from a ridership and environmental perspective. And the plan floated by Fiona Ma and Cathleen Galgani to drop the insistence that LA-SF be the first line to open risks building a system that contains a missing link.

But neither are these poison pills. As I noted above, the Implementation Plan always called for private investment, to leverage the state, local, and federal funding. What seems more worrisome here is that Arnold is using HSR to advance a privatization agenda that is already being implemented in our state. HSR is too important a project to force into a shotgun wedding with Arnold’s privatization push.

BC “Pulled The Wool Over The Terminator’s Eyes” On Privatization

Back in November Arnold Schwarzenegger announced that he was going to undertake a new initiative to privatize more of the building and management of public works projects here in California. Known as “public-private partnerships” or “P3,” they’ve been employed around the world with poor results. At the time I denounced it as a dangerous giveaway, and Democratic candidate for AD-27 (should Prop 93 fail) Emily Reilly added her perspective on the failure of outsourcing design/build projects.

As the LA Times article on the announcement explained, Arnold was taking his cues from our neighbors to the (far) north, British Columbia in particular:

The Schwarzenegger administration is contemplating a plan, probably requiring state legislation, to create a California agency to oversee state and local public-private partnerships, aides said. Modeled after one in British Columbia, it would be staffed by professional financiers and other experts who could oversee the structuring of deals by both state and local governments.

But in reality, the BC model is NOT one we want to follow, as it instead proves that P3 is a costly waste that gives us nothing but higher costs and poorer quality services. So argues Bill Tieleman, one of the province’s leading left-of-center voices. Tieleman claims BC Premier Gordon Campbell, a right-wing champion of P3, has “pulled the wool over the terminator’s eyes” on these projects:

Here’s why: Despite Campbell’s boasts, public-private partnerships don’t work.

In the vast majority of examples here in B.C. and elsewhere, the costs are higher as the public gets hosed to provide private corporations with substantial profits.

Look at some of B.C.’s own bad examples.

The Abbotsford Hospital and Cancer Centre was to cost $211 million under the original P3 budget and open in 2005 – the current estimated cost is $355 million, a 68 per cent jump, and it will open this year instead.

The William Bennett Bridge in Kelowna – priced at $100 million, now estimated at $170 million, up 70 per cent.

The rapid transit Canada Line to the airport was budgeted at $1.55 billion but will now cost $2 billion, or 29 per cent more.

Or look to Brampton, Ont., which was promised a new P3 hospital with 608 beds for $350 million. It now has a hospital with just 479 beds for $550 million.

Read on for more details and examples of how this is already being implemented, without a vote of the Legislature…

As Tieleman explains, the fundamental architecture of a P3 means that it has no hope of being a good deal for Californians:

The higher costs only makes sense because can any corporation, even the world’s largest, borrow money at lower interest rates than a government? Of course not, but these enormous capital projects require significant loans to be completed.

The real reason governments use P3s is to take public infrastructure costs off their books and falsely claim they are balancing budgets and reducing debt. In reality they are borrowing money at higher rates over longer periods of time than if they had done them as public projects.

Read that again. To undertake a massive public works project, like a new Bay Bridge or high speed rail requires massive borrowing. Government can almost always borrow more cheaply than the private sector. Further, credit is becoming very difficult – and expensive – to come by in the current credit crunch. The low interest rates of the last 25 years are not likely to be seen again, certainly not on a consistent basis. Yet even before the current crunch, P3 projects have run into serious financial problems and cost overruns.

All P3 accomplishes is an accounting gimmick. The claims of savings to public budgets is Enron accounting at its finest.

Sadly, these plans are already being implemented at the state level. From notes taken at a recent meeting of the California Transportation Commission by RailPAC:

Deputy Secretary James Bougart from the California Department Business, Transportation and Housing announced the formation of a performance based infrastructure group that will form private public partnerships. The mission and methods partnerships will contain elements found in British Columbia and Ontario Canada. Commissioner Zarian asked if there was a list of private providers, but Mr. Bougart replied that some capital fund managers are interested in such partnerships and once the CTC has ‘real authority’ to lead, private contractors will be contacted.

So even though, as Tieleman noted, P3 in BC and Ontario has been a colossal failure, we’re plowing right ahead? And I assume it’s just happenstance that “some capital fund managers are interested.”

Over twenty years, California expects to spend $500 billion on infrastructure, formerly called public works.

Ah, newspeak rears its lovely head. When exactly did we all agree to this name change?

California has over a century of success with using public agencies to build public works. Our freeways are one of the world’s great engineering marvels, as is the California Aqueduct, BART, the Port of Los Angeles-Long Beach, etc. But because Arnold isn’t willing to properly fund public works, we’re going to go down a path that brings us a lower quality service for a higher cost. Taxes are never fun, but they are FAR more affordable to Californians and bring much better, effective projects than P3.

Hopefully we’ll listen when friendly British Columbians point that out to us, and not let our government repeat the mistakes of theirs.

More P3s? Are you kidding me?

Because apparently everybody loves an overpriced and overhyped idea, the Governator wants to do some more public-private partnerships for road maintenance and such:

Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger on Wednesday proposed an expanded push for public-private partnerships and set a goal to add 20,000 new engineers to California’s work force as part of his upcoming January budget plan.

The Schwarzenegger administration wants the state to expand the types of public projects that can be built with the financial might of private companies.Current law does not allow state government broad authority to use this type of contracting – known as a Performance Based Infrastructure – except in emergencies or through legislative approval. (SacBee 12.27.07)

The thing is, as both Robert and I have argued, they don’t actually end up cheaper, or more efficient. Sure, they have success stories here and there, but overwhelmingly, what ends up happening is once the cameras disappear from the press conferences hyping these P3s, the bill gets higher as the owners of the corporation demand higher and higher profits. Oh, and they don’t have the same labor standards as state agencies do.

So, yeah, let’s line the pockets of investors with our state general fund. Sounds like a great plan.

Arnold’s Privatization Push: A Dangerous Giveaway For California

The campaign to turn California’s public infrastructure over to private profit is gathering steam. Today’s LA Times reports on a new push by Arnold for privatization of public resources:

Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger signaled a major push today to engage private companies in the construction and management of state and local infrastructure, adopting a strategy employed in Canada, Britain and elsewhere…

The Schwarzenegger administration is contemplating a plan, probably requiring state legislation, to create a California agency to oversee state and local public-private partnerships, aides said. Modeled after one in British Columbia, it would be staffed by professional financiers and other experts who could oversee the structuring of deals by both state and local governments.

As Brian explained in his excellent Pat Brown is Rolling Over In His Grave post last month, this push is part of a broader assault on the public ownership and operation of our basic infrastructure. The LA Times does not quote a single opponent of privatization, instead casting opponents as merely greedy special interests wanting to protect their fief:

opposition from labor unions and from legislators reluctant to give up too much control over big spending projects.

One of Arnold’s financial advisors, David Crane, is allowed to declare that this is about innovation and progress:

Whereas we’re a very innovative state in many ways, when it comes to infrastructure we are less innovative, and the governor intends to bring public-private partnerships into our portfolio.

Read on to see why this is a dangerous idea…

In Naomi Klein’s new book The Shock Doctrine, she explains how the last 30 years of neoliberal economic policy, aimed at the transfer of wealth away from working people and toward a small elite, was implemented largely through the taking advantage of a crisis, a crisis usually manufactured by those same neoliberals. As she explained it to Democracy Now!:

The shock doctrine, like all doctrines, is a philosophy of power. It’s a philosophy about how to achieve your political and economic goals. And this is a philosophy that holds that the best way, the best time, to push through radical free-market ideas is in the aftermath of a major shock. Now, that shock could be an economic meltdown. It could be a natural disaster.

She went on to explain that Milton Friedman played a key role in articulating this idea:

He had a vision of society, in which the only acceptable role for the state was to enforce contracts and to protect borders. Everything else should be completely left to the market, whether education, national parks, the post office; everything that could be performed at a profit should be. And he really saw, I guess, shopping — buying and selling — as the highest form of democracy, as the highest form of freedom.

That digression is significant because David Crane, Arnold’s privatization guru, is a self-described follower of Friedman:

Crane’s economic philosophy sounds distinctly libertarian. He advocates against government intervention in private business and touts his admiration for conservative economist Milton Friedman.

“Governments don’t create jobs, and if they are not careful they can kill jobs,” Crane told an audience of business leaders at a San Francisco
luncheon last summer.

The Capitol Weekly profile that quote is taken from (linked above) goes on to detail Crane’s right-wing economic views, which hold that public pensions are “special privileges” and that the minimum wage hurts jobs. The Capitol Weekly claims his “abrasive” personality has alienated him from many Sacramento lobbyists and interest groups, which along with his right-wing economic views cost him a spot as a CalSTRS trustee earlier this year.

It’s not that Crane and his ideas are right-wing that is the problem. No, the real issue is that public-private partnerships (PPP or P3) don’t actually work in practice. Arnold is taking his cues from British Columbia, whose right-wing government has aggressively pursued P3. They point to British Columbia’s P3 projects as if we’re supposed to ooh and aah. Instead these projects have been extremely contentious, cost FAR more than originally anticipated, and caused a massive corruption scandal when the RCMP (the Mounties) raided the BC Legislature and found evidence that companies bribed government officials to win the privatization of BC Rail. A Canadian public employees union sums up the flaws of P3:

•P3s are being aggressively pursued in BC in spite of a lack of evidence that they are a superior option.
•P3s are less cost-effective, timely and transparent than traditional government procurement.
•Partnerships BC, whose mandate is both to promote P3s and evaluate whether they are appropriate for use on specific projects, cannot adequately protect the public
interest.

Another Canadian union has collected an extensive list of P3 problems. They note that in Ontario, a P3 hospital cost $300 million more than if it would have been publicly built.

Britain is also cited as having successful P3 projects. But in fact, their P3 projects and privatization have led to disaster and even deadly tragedy, especially on Britain’s P3 and privatized railways. As Christian Wolmar explains in his 2005 book On The Wrong Line: How Ideology and Incompetence Wrecked Britain’s Railways:

Britain’s rail privatisation has been one of the greatest political failures of recent history. A well-functioning industry was torn apart to satisfy political dogma and privatised in a way that not only compromised safety and wrecked performance but also resulted in financial melt-down…A decade after privatisation the railways receive more taxpayers’ money – over £6bn per year – than ever before. Yet there are still more late trains than in the days of British Rail which, though accused by the government of being inefficient and expensive, provided a better service and more investment on a fifth of today’s subsidies.

California is no stranger to P3 projects. In the 1990s a private company built the 91 Express Lanes – toll lanes in the middle of the extremely congested 91 freeway between Anaheim and Corona. Significantly, the private builders did not believe they could turn a profit without a “non-compete agreement” preventing Caltrans from widening the 91, even though such widening was sorely needed.

As it turned out, the 91 Express Lanes failed to ease congestion and was rumored to be financially insolvent (a charge never proven one way or the other because the books remained private). In 2002 the Orange County Transportation Authority, sick of the ongoing congestion, bought out the 91 Express Lanes at a cost of $207 million, so as to remove the non-compete agreement.

In Stockton, a deeply controversial water privatization was rescinded earlier this year after opponents successfully sued in federal court. As the Sierra Club noted, the privatization actually would lead to a serious decline in water quality and maintenance:

In fact, the city did no environmental review at all, despite evidence for potentially severe environmental consequences. At a time when the Sacramento Delta water system is already polluted and highly fragile, OMI-Thames declared a “Run to Fail” operating mode, consciously deciding to neglect management problems until resulting in harmful infrastructure neglect. The company proposed severe budgets cuts that would have undoubtedly affected quality of services in several arenas, including maintenance of systems, disposal of waste, dealing with vermin, odor control, and sewage over flows…

In Atlanta, for instance, after privatizing the water systems, the quality of the drinking water degraded to such a point as to make it undrinkable. Suez, the largest private water corporation in the world, operated the water systems, and as a result, the rates increased, the water became brown and people were advised to boil the water before drinking.

What, then, are the lessons of P3 around the Anglo world?

  • Failure to actually save money – instead they actually COST taxpayers more than a publicly funded project
  • Failure to provide efficient, quality services – instead they put people at risk
  • Lack of public oversight
  • Corruption

California should know better especially with regard to the latter point. Public infrastructure is public for a damn good reason. As California knew all too well, when vital transportation infrastructure is in the hands of private companies, they WILL use it to screw lower- and middle-income people and small and medium-sized businesses. The Southern Pacific railroad was the primary example here in CA – and to protect their cash cow they turned the State Legislature into a wholly owned subsidiary. They made the current system of corporate contributions look positively clean.

Because of SP’s many faults, Californians in the 20th century insisted that the road network they were developing (a network that barely existed in 1900) be owned by the public. This was a universal sentiment across the state. Hell, even the reactionary LA Times led the fight for a publicly-owned port (which is why the Port of Los Angeles is at San Pedro and not Santa Monica as originally planned).

By paying for infrastructure out of tax dollars, you can provide the kind of network that a modern society needs to function without causing ruin to the poorest and most vulnerable members of our society and parts of our economy. Additionally, by providing for infrastructure on an as-needed basis instead of on a “what will make us money” basis, every part of California gets to benefit from the public transportation system, even if they are poor or sparsely populated.

Going down the privatization road is a path that will ensure some wealthy areas have great infrastructure, and everyone else has squat, because private companies will see no incentive to build rail to South LA or rebuild sewers in east Oakland.

But we’re going to go down that path not because we must, but because California politicians are not willing to properly fund public infrastructure. Taxes are never fun, but they are FAR more affordable to Californians and bring much better, effective services than privatized services.

Ultimately, it seems more and more clear that this is deliberate. Arnold is leading a California Shock Doctrine in which taxes are kept low, even at the cost of fire protection, in which higher ed is slowly but steadily privatized, closing off access to education, basic security, and opportunity to all but those who can afford it. He “solved” the previous budget crisis by gutting $6 billion in MVET revenue and borrowed to cover the rest, leaving the state vulnerable to a fiscal crisis that can then be used to sell off effective, affordable, productive public assets. Privatization and P3 is but the final blow.